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During his first month in office, President Alvaro Arzu carried out the most far-reaching shake-up
of the army leadership since Guatemala returned to civilian rule in 1986. The Arzu administration
also began a major purge of the civilian police forces discharging nearly 200 police officers and
commanders suspected of corruption and human rights violations and the government reinitiated
peace negotiations with guerrilla organizations to end the country's 36-year-old civil war. When
Arzu took over the reins of government on Jan. 14 from ex-president Ramiro de Leon Carpio, it
marked the end of a shaky transition period in Guatemala's fledgling democracy. The country
returned to civilian rule in 1986, following more than three decades of nearly uninterrupted military
governments.
In mid-1993, however, then president Jorge Serrano Elias attempted to shut down Congress and the
judiciary in an effort to rule the country by decree, a move modeled on the self-inflicted coup d'etat
of Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, who closed the legislature and judicial branch in Peru in
April 1992 and then ruled by decree until October 1993. In contrast to Fujimori, Serrano's attempted
coup failed completely, and Ramiro de Leon until then the country's human rights ombudsman
was elected by Congress to replace Serrano and serve out the remainder of his term (see NotiSur,
05/28/93 and 06/11/93).
Thus, Arzu's inauguration marked the country's full return to normal constitutional rule, in
effect solidifying the democratic process and making any new attempt to roll back institutional
order highly unlikely. "My departure from office marks the culmination of a difficult, critical
transition," said Ramiro de Leon in his farewell speech. "I was given the historic opportunity and
the responsibility to guide the country out of the abyss of constitutional crisis and into the path of
democratic consolidation and institutional fortification."
Simultaneously with Arzu's inauguration, 80 members of the unicameral National Congress, 300
mayors, and 20 delegates to the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN) all elected in the Nov.
7 general elections took office. The president, the national legislators, and the mayors will all serve
four-year terms. The PARLACEN deputies will serve five years in office. In his inaugural speech,
Arzu stressed that his administration will concentrate on three broad goals: economic development,
lasting peace, and personal security for all Guatemalan citizens. Regarding the first goal, the
president said his government would pursue state modernization and market reforms to generate
growth, but that the country's elite must be willing to share a greater portion of the nation's wealth
with lower-income groups. "The best social policies can only succeed if there are efficient economic
strategies to foment development," said Arzu. "We will aggressively promote investment, enforcing
transparency in all state programs, as well as clear rules and guidelines. But it is essential that we
fight against inequality, discrimination, and poverty...My government will enforce an efficient fiscal
system that is capable of generating the resources necessary to attend to the needs of the poor.
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I give my guarantee to all businesspeople that the government will not squander your investments
and the taxes you pay, and I ask the private sector to generate more jobs, improve working
conditions, and raise the standard of living of workers." Regarding peace and security, Arzu said
that his government will make negotiations with the guerrillas to end the war a priority and, at
the same time, reorganize and purge the country's security forces to reinforce efficiency and bring
an end to impunity. "There are powerful groups that are accustomed to committing all kinds of
criminal acts, and they are directly linked to the state apparatus," Arzu candidly stated in his speech.
"We will never again allow the Guatemalan state to be used to cover up such crimes...The armed
forces should be modernized. My government will take steps to restructure the army. Above all, the
military should be in solidarity with the people of Guatemala and devoted to maintaining peace in
the country."
On the day of his inauguration, Arzu announced most of his cabinet appointments. In general, the
government filled the ministries with members of the governing Partido de Avanzada Nacional
(PAN), although some key positions were given to independent figures, most of whom are wellknown technocrats: Ministers * Defense Gen. Julio Balconi Turcios * Education Arabella Castro
(PAN) * Health & Social Welfare Marco Tulio Sosa (PAN) * Interior Rodolfo Mendoza (PAN) *
Economy Juan Mauricio Wurmser (private sector) * Foreign Relations Eduardo Stein (PAN) *
Labor Arnoldo Ortiz Moscoso (independent) * Energy & Mines Leonel Lopez (PAN) * Finance Jose
Alejandro Arevalo (independent) * Communications & Transportation Fritz Garcia Gallont (private
sector) * Agriculture Luis Reyes Mayen (private sector) * Culture & Sports Augusto Vela (PAN) *
Central Bank Willy Zapata (independent) Secretaries * Public Relations Ricardo de la Torre (PAN) *
Presidency Hector Cifuentes (PAN) * Personal Gustavo Porras, Maria del Carmen de Valle (PAN)
Notwithstanding Arzu's promise to pursue economic policies that emphasize greater social justice,
the president's economic cabinet is dominated by influential members of the private sector who,
while generally considered "moderates," can be expected to push forward with the neoliberal
program begun under previous administrations. Agriculture Minister Luis Reyes headed the
Camara del Agro and he is also the ex-president of the powerful business umbrella organization
Comite de Asociaciones Agropecuarias, Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras (CACIF). Economy
Minister Juan Wurmser was previously president of the Camara de Industria and he is expected to
aggressively pursue regional economic integration and export-led growth.
The head of the Central Bank, Willy Zapata, is a holdover from the past two governments and thus
represents a continuation of the restrictive fiscal and monetary policies that former presidents
Serrano and de Leon negotiated with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (see
Chronicle of Latin American Economic Affairs, 02/22/96). Finance Minister Alejandro Arevalo
is also a holdover who was the superintendent of banks under de Leon. In addition, business
representatives dominate other key economic positions in the Arzu administration. For example,
Rodolfo Paiz Andrade, whose family owns the Paiz supermarket chain the largest retail food outlet
in Central America is head of the government's Social Investment Fund (Fondo de Inversion
Social, FIS). In contrast to the economic cabinet, on the political front many of Arzu's ministerial
appointments appear to represent the commitments he outlined in his inaugural speech. In
addition, the actions taken so far by the president and his ministers seem to demonstrate a
willingness to translate words into deeds.
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When Arzu named Gen. Julio Balconi as defense minister, he ushered in the largest shake-up of the
army leadership by any civilian president since the return to constitutional rule in 1986. Within one
week after taking office, Arzu discharged from active duty eight of the 16 generals in Guatemala's
armed forces. Two of the eight were up for retirement. However, three of the remaining six all of
whom are known as "hard-liners" implicated in high-profile cases of human rights abuse were
forced into early retirement. The remaining three generals including Gen. Marco Antonio Gonzales,
who was defense minister until Arzu took office were placed on "standby," which means they
continue to draw partial salaries for the next two years, at which time they will have completed the
maximum years allowed for service and will have to retire.
In addition to the generals, most colonels and other lower-ranking officers were shuffled around
the country, with the administrative rotation affecting about 80% of all officers. And a number of
colonels were also put on "standby," while others were discharged outright. Among the colonels
whose careers were ended are two who were linked to killings involving US citizens. One is Col.
Julio Roberto Alpirez, an intelligence officer accused of complicity in the 1992 torture and slaying
of captured guerrilla leader Efrain Bamaca, husband of US lawyer Jennifer Harbury. Last year,
US congressional Rep. Robert Torricelli (D-NJ) disclosed that Col. Alpirez was a paid agent of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) at the time of the Bamaca's killing (see NotiSur, 03/31/95, 04/14/95
and 05/05/95). Alpirez and Col. Mario Roberto Garcia Catalan, another officer discharged in January,
were both accused of obstructing the investigation in the case of Michael Devine, a US citizen slain
in 1990 at a base in the northern department of El Peten that was under Alpirez's command at the
time.
The government has so far downplayed the shake-up, calling the rotations and dismissals "routine."
Nevertheless, the outcome of the shuffle has clearly eliminated key officers linked to human rights
abuses or corruption, while shifting control of the high command and strategic bases to officers
who support or at least tolerate peace negotiations with the guerrillas. "The president has not said
exactly why he did it, but the objective fact is that people with nasty records are being pushed out,"
a diplomat who monitors the military recently told the New York Times. Indeed, Defense Minister
Balconi was a member of the government peace commission (Comision por la Paz, COPAZ) under
ex-president de Leon. And like Balconi, the new chief and deputy chief of staff are both members of
the moderate faction of the military known as the "institutionalist" wing. The shake-up may have
sown deep divisions and resentment among hard-line officers around the country. Among other
things, in late January a clandestine communique was circulated by a group that claimed to be made
up of active-duty officers.
The group (Por la Reivindicacion del Ejercito de Guatemala, PREGUA) claimed that it represents
the views of disgruntled officers who want to clean up the army's image. The communique lists the
names of 55 officers allegedly implicated in human rights crimes and corruption. PREGUA calls
for the trial and punishment of those named, but says that, if no action is taken against the officers,
the group will execute them. PREGUA appears strikingly similar to a clique of army dissidents
that formed the Oficiales de la Montana group in 1988. That group also accused many in the army
hierarchy of corruption and other crimes, and its members were apparently extreme-right dissidents
who helped plan and execute two failed coup d'etat attempts against ex-president Vinicio Cerezo
(1986-1990) in 1988 and 1989.
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Thus, PREGUA like the Oficiales de la Montana may be less concerned with human rights abuses by
those it accuses than with maintaining the hard-liners' influence in the army. Given the widespread
rumors of internal army conflicts, political tensions have gripped the country since the army shakeup began. On Feb. 4, the president's personal bodyguards shot and killed a milkman who happened
to drive his truck in front of Arzu and his wife as they were riding horses outside the capital. The
incident was reported as an assassination attempt that the presidential guard managed to foil, thus
receiving widespread domestic and international attention.
In the end, the office of the human rights ombudsman which investigated the incident concluded
that no assassination attempt took place. But the intense public attention that was riveted on the
case reflects the political tensions that permeate the country. When the incident occurred, most
analysts believed that the alleged assassin had been sent by army hard-liners as a warning to the
president. In addition to the shake-up in the army leadership, the government has also launched
a far-reaching purge of the civilian police forces. At the end of January and beginning of February,
Interior Minister Rodolfo Mendoza fired nearly 200 police officers, nearly 100 of whom were precinct
commanders, for corruption and human rights abuses.
Another 1,500 members of the 12,000-strong National Police (PN) are under investigation.
According to Mendoza, the aim is to clean up the security apparatus and "demilitarize" civilian
police structures. The UN Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) has provided five police experts to
advise the minister on the reforms, and the UN Development Program is also providing technical
assistance. The minister set a deadline of 180 days to carry out the purge and substantially lower
criminal activity in the country. Among other things, Mendoza proposes to fuse the nation's three
police forces PN, Treasury Police (Guardia de Hacienda, GH), and the Military Police (Policia Militar
Ambulante, PMA) into one security body to be completely controlled by civilians. If carried out, it
would signify the demilitarization of the PMA, which is presently run by the army. Meanwhile, the
government has also reinitiated peace negotiations with the country's four guerrilla organizations,
grouped in the umbrella Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG).
After a series of low-level exploratory talks with the guerrillas and with UN officials who are
mediating the peace negotiations, the government agreed to hold the first round of conversations
with URNG leaders in Mexico City Feb. 22-23. At the meeting, the two sides will resume
negotiations on "economic issues and the agrarian situation." COPAZ and the URNG have been
stuck on that agenda point since early 1995. The last meeting was held in mid-December, at
which time COPAZ and the URNG agreed to suspend talks pending the installation of the new
government. In his inaugural speech, President Arzu optimistically claimed that his administration
would work toward the signing of a final peace accord within seven to eight months. Such a time
frame is considered extremely unrealistic given the complexity of the present agenda item under
debate, as well as the delicate nature of the next item on the agenda: fortification of civilian power
and the army's role in a democratic society.
Nevertheless, Arzu's decision to revamp COPAZ and reorganize the government structures that
were set up to manage the negotiations may well reinvigorate the entire peace process. For one
thing, Arzu named well-known leftist Gustavo Porras as the new head of COPAZ, replacing Hector
Rosada. Porras, who spent many years in exile, is considered a "guerrilla sympathizer" by the
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country's right- wing groups. Under Porras's direction, COPAZ is expected to become much more
agile in its dealings with the URNG. More important, however, Arzu has greatly increased the role
of the Foreign Ministry in the peace negotiations, and he appointed Eduardo Stein and Gabriel
Aguilera two other well-known leftists as minister and vice-minister, respectively.
By increasing the Foreign Ministry's participation in the process, Arzu has simultaneously decreased
the army's influence at the bargaining table, since, until now, COPAZ was the sole negotiator
for the government and the Peace Commission's statutes require that three of COPAZ's seven
delegates be army officers appointed directly by the military. Under the leadership of Stein and
Aguilera, the Foreign Ministry is expected to spearhead an aggressive diplomatic effort to generate
international support for the peace process, thus bringing much greater pressure to bear on both
the army and the URNG to sign a peace accord as soon as possible. [Sources: Notimex, 01/15/96;
Tico Times (Costa Rica), 01/19/96; Associated Press, 01/21/96; Central America Update (Guatemala),
01/31/96; Cerigua Weekly Briefs (Guatemala), 01/04/96, 02/01/96; La Jornada (Mexico), Deutsche
Press Agentur, 02/05/96; Inter Press Service, 01/15/96, 01/19/96, 02/05/96, 02/06/96; New York
Times, 02/07/96; Inforpress Centroamericana (Guatemala), 01/11/96, 01/18/96, 01/25/96, 02/01/96,
02/08/96; Reuter, 01/09/96, 01/12-14/96, 02/04/96, 02/05/96, 02/09/96; Agencia Centroamericana
de Noticias-Spanish news service EFE, 01/09/96, 01/14-16/96, 01/18/96, 01/20/96, 01/21/96, 01/2426/96, 02/03/96, 02/09/96, 02/15/96, 02/17/96, 02/19/96; Agence France-Presse, 01/11/96, 01/13-15/96,
01/17/96, 02/04/96, 02/05/96, 02/08/96, 02/17/96, 02/18/96, 02/20/96, 02/21/96]

-- End --
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